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Abstract—We study the impact of end-user behavior on
user/network association in a HetNet with multiple service
providers (SPs). Specifically, we consider the uncertainty in the
service guarantees offered by SPs in a HetNet, and use Prospect
Theory (PT) to model end-user decision making. We formulate
user association with SPs as a multiple leader Stackelberg game
where each SP offers a data rate to each user with a certain
service guarantee and at a certain price, while the user chooses the
best offer among multiple such bids. Using the specific example of
a HetNet with one cellular base station and one WiFi access point,
we show that when the end users underestimate the advertised
service guarantees, then some of the Nash Equilibrium strategies
under the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) model become infeasible
under PT, and for those Nash Equilibria that are feasible under
both EUT and PT, the resulting user utilities are less under PT.
We propose resource allocation and bidding mechanisms for the
SPs to mitigate these effects.
Keywords—user association, HetNets, spectrum allocation,
game theory, prospect theory, Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of HetNets for network densification in
future wireless networks has lead to extensive user association
studies in this context [1], [2]. The range of approaches include
evolutionary game theory [3], [4], auction based models [5],
matching theory [6], Stackelberg, the competitive approach
using Colonel Blotto game [7], [8], and other gametheoretic
models [9]–[13]. However, most of these mechanisms essen-
tially are borne out of expected utility theory (EUT) based
approaches. When a service provider (SP) controls access to
end-users via differentiated and hierarchical monetary pricing,
then the performance of the network is directly subject to
end-user decision-making that has shown to deviate from
EUT in many cases [14]–[17]. In this work, we use Prospect
Theory [14], a Nobel prize winning theory that explains real-
life decision-making and its deviations from EUT behavior,
to study user decisions in wireless HetNets. To do so, we
first formulate the user association problem in HetNets as a
Stackelberg game between SPs and user, in which WiFi and
cellular SPs as the leaders of the game make offers to the
user, and the user as a follower makes a decision about the
received offers. Then based on the user response to received
offers, the SPs optimize their bids to maximize their utility.
By considering a convex pricing function for the SPs and a
concave payoff function for the users, we compare the utility
of both user and SPs under EUT and PT. We derive all
possible pure strategy and mixed strategy NEs for the proposed
Stackelberg game. We also provide the conditions under which
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the existence of such NEs are guaranteed, for both EUT and PT
cases. To see the effects of heterogeneity of the SPs, we also
compare the results for both symmetric and non-symmetric SP
models. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
which address PT effects on user association in HetNets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II,
after describing the HetNet model, we introduce the model of
interactions between SPs and users as a Stackelberg game, and
formulate user association problem. In section III, we discuss
the best response strategies for all players, and in section IV,
we derive all the possible NE strategies, and the conditions
under which the existence of such NEs can be guaranteed
under EUT. In section V we show the impacts of PT on
user association and consequently its effect on SP utilities.
In section VI we introduce resource allocation and bidding
strategies for SPs to compensate part of their lost utility under
PT. We validate the analysis in the paper using simulation
results in section VII and conclude in section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Network Model
To study user association in HetNets, we developed a two-
tier HetNet scenario which includes N wireless users that
are randomly distributed within the coverage area of K base
stations. As shown in Fig. 1, in our HetNet model there is
one macrocell LTE BS located in the center of the area and
K−1 overlaid small cell WiFi access points who are competing
with each other to serve the users in the HetNet. We assume
each user in the HetNet receives several offers from service
providers (SPs) in both cellular and WiFi tiers, and upon
receiving such offers, the user makes a decision to accept or
reject any of the received offers. As we can see in Fig. 1, the
number of users (load) in each small cell could be different
than other cells, and also the number of covering BSs for each
user can differ from other users. Moreover, depending on the
level of noise and attenuation on each user-BS link, the users
in each part of the network may experience different channel
gains than other users.
B. Stackelberg Game for User Association in HetNets
In our HetNet model, each user receives K different offers
from all K base stations, i.e., one offer from the cellular BS
and K − 1 offers from the WiFi BSs. To enable multihoming,
we assume each user can be simultaneously connected to both
cellular and WiFi SPs to receive the data service. Specifically,
we assume that each user can only be associated to the cellular
SP and the best serving WiFi SP for that specific user, which
is the SP who offers a bid with highest utility among all WiFi
SPs. Hence, we model user association problem in this work
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Fig. 1. Heterogeneous Network (HetNet) Model.
as a Stackelberg game with two leaders and one follower,
where SPs act as the leaders who make service offers to
the user, and the user serves as a follower who accepts or
rejects the received offers. Since we have N users in our
HetNet model, to solve the user/network association problem
in a distributed manner, we need to solve N stackelberg
games each with three players including WiFi SP and cellular
SP as the leaders and one user as the follower. Since these
N Stackelberg games are independent, assuming the BS’s
maximum bandwidth budget per user is fixed and the same
for all users as shown in Eq. 14, we can consider and solve
only one of these Stackelberg games without loss of generality.
Note that finding the optimal bandwidth/power allocation for
SPs is a NP-hard problem [5], [18] and not the focus of this
paper. In the remainder of this paper, we focus on one of
these games. Using the index w for user’s preferred WiFi SP
and the index c for cellular SP, we denote the bids of WiFi
and cellular SPs with triples (bw, rEUT (bw), BWw,EUT ), and
(bc, rEUT (bc), BWc,EUT ), respectively, in which the first term
shows the advertised data rate, the second term is the proposed
price for the offered data rate, and the third term is the amount
of BW that will be allocated to the user by each SP. User
decisions are binary, which means the user either accepts a bid
or rejects it, and there is no probabilistic decision by user. We
denote user decisions on cellular and WiFi SPs offers with pc
and pw respectively, which are binary variables. So, the tuple
(pc, pw) represents user’s strategy with regard to the received
bids, hence, the user has four possible strategies (0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0) and (1, 1). All three players have a cost function and
a benefit function, and their utility functions are simply the
difference of the cost and benefit functions. We represent user’s
utility function as:
Uuser,EUT {pc, pw} = H (Bjoint)− cuser (pw, pc) (1)
where H(Bjoint) = δ(Bjoint)1/θ is the users benefit function
which is a logarithmic concave function of the aggregate
data rate achieved, Bjoint, by the user, and cuser (pw, pc) =
pwrEUT (bw) + pcrEUT (bc) is the user’s cost function which
shows the aggregate price that must be paid by user to the SPs
for each (pc, pw) strategy. The aggregate data rate is defined as
Bjoint = bcF¯Bc(bc, BWc,EUT )pc+bwF¯Bw(bw, BWw,EUT )pw
where F¯Bc(bc, BWc,EUT ) is the service guarantee of the offer
received from the cellular SP, and denotes the probability of
having the actual data rate of user from cellular SP, Bc, equal
or higher than the advertised data rate by cellular SP, bc.
Similar definition holds for F¯Bw(bw, BWw,EUT ) which is the
service guarantee of the offer received from WiFi SP.
Once the user chooses its best response strategy, (p∗c , p
∗
w),
the SPs will respond with their best response strategies to max-
imize their own utilities based on the received user decision.
The utility of the WiFi SP, USP,w is defined as
USP,w = pwrEUT (bw)− Cw(bw, BWw,EUT ), (2)
and the utility of cellular SP, USP,c is defined as
USP,c = pcrEUT (bc)− Cc(bc, BWc,EUT ), (3)
where, the first term in both of these equations is the SPs’
expected payoff from the user, and the second term is their
incurred service cost. The SPs’ payoff from the user is
equal to the offered price in their bids if the user accepts
their offers, otherwise their payoff from the user is equal
to zero. Overpricing may lead the user to reject their bids,
and underpricing may lead their utility to be negative. So,
choosing a proper pricing function is critical for the SPs.
In this work, we assume both SPs use convex pricing func-
tions, as rEUT (bw) = α1(bw)β1 , and rEUT (bc) = α2(bc)β2 ,
(β1, β2 > 1), where α1 and β1 are payoff parameters for
the WiFi SP, and α2 and β2 are payoff parameters for the
cellular SP. We also assume the SPs use linear cost func-
tions, as Cw(bw, BWw,EUT ) = c1(bw) + c2(BWw,EUT ), and
Cc(bc, BWc,EUT ) = c3(bc) + c4(BWc,EUT ), where c1 and c2
are cost coefficients for the WiFi SP, and c3 and c4 are cost
coefficients for the cellular SP. To satisfy the user’s minimum
data rate constraint, the SPs must ensure that their offered
data rate is higher than the minimum data rate required by
the user, bmin. Thus, the data rate constraints for the WiFi and
the cellular SPs will be defined as below, respectively:
bwF¯Bw(bw, BWw,EUT ) ≥ bmin, (4)
bcF¯Bc(bc, BWc,EUT ) ≥ bmin. (5)
III. BEST RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR PLAYERS
A. User Optimization Problem
Upon receiving the offers from the SPs, the user will run
an optimization problem to find its best strategy with regard
to received offers. We assume the user’s payoff function from
the received data is a concave function, as defined in Eq.
1, in which the user’s utility is not linearly increased with
increasing the data rate. It means that as long as the minimum
data rate constraint is satisfied, the user is not willing to pay
extra price with linear relation to the extra data rate offered
by SPs. To find its best response strategy,(p∗c , p
∗
w), user will
run the following optimization problem (denoted as Max1):
Max1 Problem: User’s Utility Maximization.
—————————————————————————-
max
pc,pw
[ δ(Bjoint)
1/θ − pwα1(bw)β1 − pcα2(bc)β2 ] (6)
subject to
Bjoint ≥ bmin (7)
δ(Bjoint)
1/θ ≥ pwα1(bw)β1 + pcα2(bc)β2 , (8)
pc, pw ∈ {0, 1} (9)
As shown above, the user has two major constraints for
bid selection. The first constraint, shown in Eq. 7, is the user’s
data rate constraint which ensures the expected data rate for
the user is higher than its minimum required data rate, bmin.
The second constraint defined in Eq. 8 is the user’s utility
constraint which guarantees a positive utility for the user from
its strategy.
B. SPs Optimization Problems
When the SPs receive user’s decision with regard to
their offers, they choose their best response strategy. The the
best response strategy (b∗w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) for the WiFi BSs is
obtained by solving the optimization problem below (denoted
as Max2):
Max2 Problem: WiFi SP’s Utility Maximization.
—————————————————————————-
max
bw,BWw,EUT
[pwα1(bw)
β1 − (c1bw + c2BWw,EUT ) ] (10)
subject to
0 ≤ BWw,EUT ≤ BWw,max, (11)
0 ≤ bw ≤ bw,max, (12)
bwF¯Bw(bw, BWw,EUT ) ≥ bmin, (13)
in which, BWw,max is the maximum amount of bandwidth
that can be allocated to the user by the WiFi SP, and bw,max
is the maximum achievable data rate by the user from the
WiFi SP considering BWw,max and the gain of the channel
between the WiFi SP and the user. We assume the SPs use a
proportionally fair bandwidth allocation algorithm to determine
the maximum amount of bandwidth that can be allocated to
each of their users. Assuming BW as the total amount of
bandwidth available at SP i, i ∈ {w, c}, and N as the total
number of users in our HetNet, the maximum amount of
bandwidth that can be allocated to each user by the SP i,
BWi,max is given as
BWi,max = (GBA ∗ BW )/
N∑
j=1
(aj ∗ cj), (14)
in which GBA is the gain of bandwidth allocation which is
less than one due to the guard bands between channels for
preventing interference, aj is a binary variable showing the
activity of the users which aj = 1 if the user j is active and
has data demand, otherwise aj = 0, and cj is also a binary
variable representing the coverage of the user j by the the BS
i, where cj = 1 if the SINR of the link between the user j and
the BS i is higher than a certain threshold to have a reliable
transmission, otherwise cj = 0. Considering BWi,max, the
maximum achievable data rate by user, bi,max is given by:
bi,max = BWi,max log(1 +
Phjajcj
σ2
), (15)
where, P is the transmit power of the BS, hj is the channel
gain between the user j and the SP i, and σ2 is the noise
variance over the transmission channel. Similarly, the cellular
SP runs Max3 optimization problem, which is defined exactly
similar to Max2, except the index w is replaced with the
index c and the parameters α1, β1, c1, c2 are replaced with
the parameters α2, β2, c3, c4, respectively. In Theorem 1, we
prove that for both WiFi and cellular SPs, the best response
strategies derived from Max2 and Max3 optimization
problems, satisfy the minimum data rate constraint with
equality.
Theorem 1: The SPs best response strategies, derived from
Max2 and Max3 problems, will always satisfy the minimum
data rate constraint in the boundary of its feasibility region,
i.e. we always have b∗wF¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) = bmin, and
b∗c F¯Bc(b
∗
c , BW
∗
c,EUT ) = bmin for the WiFi and the Cellular
SPs, respectively.
Proof: We prove this by contradiction for the WiFi
SP. Assume (b∗w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) is the optimal solution for
Max2 problem, and BW ∗w,EUT is not a marginal BW, i.e.
b∗wF¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) 6= bmin. Considering Eq. 13, we
can infer that b∗wF¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) > bmin (1). In this
case ∃ BW ′w,EUT such that b∗wF¯Bw(b∗w, BW ′w,EUT ) = bmin
(2). From (1) and (2), and considering the direct relation
between FBw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) and BW
∗
w,EUT , we can infer
that BW ′w,EUT < BW
∗
w,EUT . Now, considering the WiFi SP’s
utility function defined in Eq. (11) and due to its reverse rela-
tion with the advertised bandwidth, BWw,EUT , we can infer
that USP,w(b∗w, BW
′
w,EUT ) > USP,w(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) which
is in conflict with the initial assumption that (b∗w, BW
∗
w,EUT )
is the optimal solution for Max2 problem. So, the proof is
complete. The same proof is valid for the cellular SP.
IV. NE EXISTENCE ANALYSIS UNDER EUT
We derive all the potential Nash Equilibrium strategies for
the user in the proposed Stackelberg game under EUT. To see
the effects of the SPs heterogeneity on the existence of NE,
we consider both symmetric and asymmetric SPs cases.
A. Symmetric SPs under EUT
Under the symmetric model, we assume both SPs offer the
same data rate and use the same pricing and cost functions, i.e.
α1 = α2 = α, β1 = β2 = β, c1 = c3 = cb, c2 = c4 = cBW .
In this situation, both SPs offer (b∗, BW ∗) with the price of
rEUT (b
∗) = α(b∗)β , and this offer costs cbb∗ + cBWBW ∗
for them. Table I summarizes the NE strategies for the user
and their existence conditions under EUT for both symmetric
and asymmetric SPs cases. As we can see from this table,
under symmetric case user has two pure strategy NEs, (0, 0)
and (1, 1), and one mixed strategy NE, (1, 0)/(0, 1). In fact, if
the user’s payoff coefficient, δ, is less than a threshold which
guarantees positive utility for the user, it will choose (0, 0)
strategy and rejects both of received offers. However, if the
user’s payoff coefficient is big enough such that the expected
payoff of the user from expected data rate is higher than the
TABLE I. NE TABLE FOR USER UNDER EUT.
offered price for it, i.e. δ(bmin)1/θ ≥ α(b∗)β then the user
will accept at least one of the SPs offers. Note that in this
situation, the user’s expected data rate from both SPs is 2bmin
and the expected price for it is 2α(b∗)β . However, due to the
concavity of the user’s payoff function, when the data rate
is doubled, the resulting payoff from that data rate will not
be doubled for the user, and is less than twice of the initial
payoff. In this situation, if the extra payoff from the second SP,
H(2bmin)−H(bmin) = δ(21/β − 1)(bmin)1/θ, is higher than
the extra price asked for it by second SP, α(b∗)β , then the user
will choose (1, 1) strategy and accepts both of received offers.
Otherwise, the user accepts one of the received offers only, and
due to the symmetry of received bids, the user will choose one
of WiFi or cellular offers with the same chance, each time. It
leads the user to have a mixed strategy NE (0, 1)/(1, 0) which
means in half of the times the user will choose the WiFi SP
offer, and in the other half the user will choose the cellular
SP offer. Consequently, because the SPs know that their offers
are not going to be accepted by the user in 50% of times, they
will also choose a mixed strategy of (b∗, BW ∗)/(0, 0) which
means in half of the times they prefer to stay silent and not
offer any data rate to prevent negative utility as a result of
being rejected by the user.
B. Asymmetric SPs under EUT
Under the asymmetric model, we assume the SPs have
different pricing and cost functions, as defined in subsection
II.??. We denote the WiFi and the cellular SPs best response
strategies under asymmetric model as (b∗w, BW
∗
w,EUT ), and
(b∗c , BW
∗
c,EUT ), respectively. Here we assume due to better
channel conditions and SINR, the WiFi SP offers its data
service with a cheaper price as compared to the cellular SP,
i.e. α1(b∗w)
β1 ≤ α2(b∗c)β2 . In fact, because the WiFi SP
requires less amount of BW to satisfy user minimum data
rate, it’s cost in serving user is lower than the cellular SP,
thus it justifies the WiFi SP’s demand for the lower price.
Note that, despite offering different bids by the WiFi and the
cellular SPs, because of Theorem 1, still the user’s expected
data rate from each of them is equal to bmin considering the
service guarantees, i.e. b∗wF¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) = bmin, and
b∗c F¯Bc(b
∗
c , BW
∗
c,EUT ) = bmin. As shown in Table I, we don’t
have any mixed strategy NE under asymmetric model. The
reason is that, when the user’s best response strategy is to
accept only one of the received bids, it will always accept the
bid from superior SP which leads to a higher utility for him,
which is the WiFi SP in our case. That’s why the user does
not have (1, 0) NE strategy under asymmetric model, and it
only has three pure strategy NEs, including (0, 0), (0, 1) and
(1, 1). According to the user’s NE table under EUT, if the
user’s payoff coefficient, δ, is not bigger than a threshold to
guarantee a positive utility for the user from accepting any bid,
then the user will choose (0, 0) strategy and rejects both of
the received offers. When the user’s expected utility from the
WiFi SPs offer is positive but accepting both offers together
reduces the user’s utility, the user will choose (0,1) strategy
to accept the WiFi SP’s bid and reject the cellular SP’s offer.
However, when the user’s payoff coefficient is bigger than a
threshold shown in Table I, then the extra payoff of the user
achieved from the cellular SP is higher than the price asked
by the cellular SP, and it convinces the user to accept both
offers even though the WiFi SP offer is enough to guarantee
its minimum data rate. In this situation, the user’s expected
utility from (1, 1) strategy is higher than its expected utility
from (0, 1) strategy, and thus the user chooses (1, 1) to achieve
higher utility.
V. NE EXISTENCE ANALYSIS UNDER PT
So far, our analysis on the existence of NE and derivation
of the user’s best response strategies was based on EUT.
In fact, when the user is making decisions about a system
with some uncertainty in system parameters, like the service
guarantees in our model, EUT fails to describe the user
decisions precisely. In this situation, we use Prospect Theory
to model user decisions and to capture the psychophysics
of end-user decision making [17]. To do so, we assume the
SPs still make the same offers to the user as they did under
EUT, however, we assume the user makes decisions about the
received offers based on PT. In this work, we just focus on the
probability weighting effect (PWE) of PT to see its effects on
the NEs of our Stackelberg game. We use the Prelec function
[19] to model the PWE under PT:
w(p) = exp(−(−ln(p)α), (0 < α < 1). (16)
This function is a regressive and s-shaped function which is
concave in 0 < p < 1/e region and convex in 1/e < p < 1
region, and w(p) > p in the former domain while w(p) < p
in the later. Considering this function to model PWE of PT,
we can infer that the user overestimates the service guarantees
of the received offers if the advertised service guarantees are
less than 1/e = 0.37%, and user over estimates them if
advertised service guarantees are higher than 0.37%. In this
work, assuming that SP networks are well designed to offer
service guarantees higher than 1/e, we focus on the under
estimating of service guarantees by the user under PT. It is
also justified by the fact that end-users in real world wireless
networks typically perceive the quality of their service as lower
than that advertised by the SPs.
TABLE II. NE TABLE FOR USER UNDER PT.
A. Symmetric SPs under PT
In this case, we assume both SPs use the same pricing and
cost functions as described in subsection IV.?? for the EUT
case. However, the user makes decision about the received
offers based on PT, and thus user’s perception of the service
guarantee will be affected by PWE of PT. In fact, the user
under estimates the service guarantees of the received offers
under PT, assuming service guarantees to be higher than 1/e.
Table II summarizes the potential NEs for the user in the Stack-
elberg game under PT for both symmetric and asymmetric SPs
cases. Under PT we only have two pure strategies, in which
the user either accepts both of the received offers or rejects
both of them, and we don’t have any NE strategy for the user
in a form of (0, 1),or (1, 0) under which the user receives
its service from only one SP. In fact, the most important
difference between PT and EUT in our model is that, under
PT, none of the individual SPs can satisfy user constraints,
independently. The reason for this is that based on Theorem
1, the SPs always satisfy the data rate constraint with equality.
Hence, under PT any under estimation of service guarantees
by the user will result in violation of the data rate bid
selection constraint for the user. In this situation, the expected
data rate for the user from any individual SP is less than
bmin, as w(F¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT )) < F¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ),
and w(F¯Bc(b
∗
c , BW
∗
c,EUT )) < F¯Bc(b
∗
c , BW
∗
c,EUT ). Hence, the
user cannot accept any individual SP offer, and both (0, 1)
and (1, 0) strategies are not feasible for the user under PT.
Unlike in the EUT case, because the data rate constraint is not
guaranteed to be satisfied for the user under PT, the user has
two conditions for each NE strategy, to ensure that both utility
constraint and data rate constraint are satisfied. If both of these
constraints are satisfied, then the user chooses (1, 1) strategy
and accepts both offers, otherwise, the user rejects both offers
by choosing (0, 0) strategy.
B. Asymmetric SPs under PT
In this case as described in subsection IV.??, we assume
the SPs use different cost and pricing functions. As mentioned
before, we assume the user will underestimate the service
guarantees of the SP offers under PT, due to PWE. Hence,
user’s estimation of the expected data rate, and the expected
payoff from the received offers will change accordingly as both
of them are functions of service guarantees. Potential NEs for
the user in the Stackelberg game under PT with asymmetric
SPs are shown in Table II. Due to underweighting of service
guarantee by the user under PT, none of individual SPs can
satisfy the users data rate constraint independently, hence, none
of (0, 1) and (1, 0) strategies are feasible for the user. In this
case, if the user’s payoff from both SPs under (1, 1) strategy is
positive, and also, the users expected data rate from both SPs
is higher than its minimum data rate, the user chooses (1, 1)
strategy and accepts both of the received offers. Otherwise, the
user rejects both of received offers by adopting (0, 0) strategy.
As we can see in Table II, the conditions for having (1, 1)
NE strategy for user under PT are stricter than in EUT case,
due to the underweighting of service guarantees which makes
it more difficult for both data rate and utility constraints to
be satisfied under PT. Further, considering the infeasibility
of (0, 1) and (1, 0) strategies, and noting that the user has
only four potential strategies, we can infer that the chance of
choosing (0, 0) strategy by the user and rejecting both of SP
offers under PT is much higher than it under EUT.
VI. PROPOSED BIDDING STRATEGY FOR SPS UNDER PT
In previous section, we inferred that under PT if the user
underestimates the advertised service guarantees, it is more
likely for the user to reject the SPs offers by choosing (0, 0)
strategy. This can reduce the utility of SPs if they do not
redesign their bidding strategies. So, in order to help the SPs
to cope with user decisions under PT, and increase the chance
of their offers to be accepted by the user, we propose a new
bidding strategy for the SPs under PT based on bandwidth
expansion [17].
A. Bandwidth Expansion Under PT
As mentioned before, under PT user replaces its subjected
service guarantee, for example w(F¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT )) for
the WiFi SP, with the service guarantee advertised by the
SPs, F¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) for the WiFi. And if the advertised
service guarantee is higher than 1/e, the user will underes-
timate it, which means we have w(F¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT )) <
F¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ). In such a situation if the SPs offer the
same bid as in EUT, the user will reject their bids as the data
rate constraint of the user will not be satisfied by such offers
under PT. So, for SPs to convince the user to accept their bids,
one way is to increase their offered bandwidth such that despite
the user’s under estimation of the service guarantee, still the
expected data rate for the user under PT is higher than its
minimum data rate threshold, bmin. If we denote BW ∗w,PT ,
and BW ∗c,PT as the amount of BW required by the WiFi and
the cellular SPs, respectively to convince the user to accept
their offers under PT, assuming their offers got accepted under
EUT, we must have:
BW ∗w,PT ≥ F¯−1Bw(λw, b∗w) (17)
where
λw = w
−1(F¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) (18)
where, (b∗w, BW
∗
w,EUT ) is the WiFi SP bid under EUT. In
fact the WiFi SP must expand its offered bandwidth so as
Fig. 2. Simulation Parameters.
Fig. 3. Comparing sum utility of BSs under three different scenarios.
to offer b∗w data rate with the service guarantee of λw,
where w(λw) = F¯Bw(b
∗
w, BW
∗
w,EUT ). This way, the extra
bandwidth offered by the WiFi SP compensates the under
estimation of the service guarantee by user under PT. Same
conditions are valid for cellular SP.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide several simulation results to
validate the efficiency of our model. We consider a HetNet
scenario similar to the one presented in Fig. 1, in which there
are N randomly distributed users that are covered by 9 BSs.
There is one cellular SP in the center of a macro cell and
8 overlaid WiFi SPs. We assume that the maximum coverage
radius for WiFi SPs is 300 ft, while, all users are located within
the coverage range of the cellular SP and can get served by
it. We use Hata propagation model for urban environments
to capture the effects of path loss on the user-BSs links. The
table below contains the description and values of different
parameters we have used in our simulations.
Fig. 3 compares the sum utility of BSs under these three
scenarios while we change the number of users (load) from
N = 50 to N = 500.
When the number of users is less than 150, PT outper-
Fig. 4. Comparing sum utility of users under three different scenarios.
forms EUT in terms of SPs sum utility. The reason is that
when the load is low, SPs offer higher data rates to users,
hence, even with low service guarantees they can satisfy the
user’s minimum data rate constraint. And due to probability
weighting effect (PWE) under PT, when the advertised service
guarantees are lower than 1/e = 0.37%, the user overestimates
service guarantees, which leads to a higher acceptance rate for
the SP offers under PT as compared to EUT. By increasing
the acceptance rate, the SPs’ sum utility is also increased.
However, by increasing the number of users, the SPs advertised
data rates will decrease as they assign less BW to each user.
They have to increase their service guarantees to satisfy the
user’s data rate constraint. Hence, the user’s acceptance rate
and consequently the SPs utilities decrease dramatically by
increasing the number of users beyond N = 150. However,
using bandwidth expansion feature under PT, the SPs are able
to retain most of their subscribed users with some extra cost.
When the number of users goes beyond 400, which is the max
network capacity under our setting, most of the SPs are not
capable of satisfying user’s data rate constraint as their BW
budget per user will diminish by increasing the load. Therefore,
the number of users associated to BSs and consequently the
SPs sum utility decreases when N is higher than 400. Fig. 4
compares the sum utility of users under EUT, PT and PT with
BW expansion for different load situations. As we expected,
there are two turning points in this diagram. The first point
is where the number of users goes beyond 150 users, which
results in a considerable dropping of user association rate and
the sum utility of users under PT. While by enabling bandwidth
expansion under PT as its shown in Fig. 4, sum utility of
users will be increased by increasing the number of users as
more users will be associated to SPs until the number of users
get close to the network capacity which is 400 users in our
setting. After that, the user association rate reduces again as
bid selection constraints for many users cannot be met by SPs
considering their limited resources.
To see how much extra costs the SPs have to incur to
retain their users under PT using bandwidth expansion, we
compare the average bandwidth consumption of users in EUT
vs PT with bandwidth expansion feature in Fig. 5. When the
Fig. 5. Comparing Avg. BW consumption per user under EUT vs PT.
SPs advertised service guarantees are less than 1/e = 0.37%
threshold, which occurs when the number of users are less
than 150, the SPs are not required to consume any extra BW
to retain their EUT users under PT. However, by increasing
the number of users beyond 150, the number of users who
receive an offer with a service guarantee higher than 0.37%
will increase. So, to retain those users under PT, the SPs have
to offer extra BW to satisfy user’s bid selection constraints.
The amount of extra BW that the SPs have to provide for the
users under PT raises by increasing the load, as the SPs’ service
guarantees increase in this situation. So, user’s underestimation
of service guarantees become more intense. Note that we used
the Perlec function with parameter α = 0.7 to capture PWE
under PT. By using lower values for α, the gap between these
two curves become larger as the number of users is increasing.
The simulation results under PT show that the SPs can retain
most of their subscribed users under EUT by offering some
extra bandwidth to them to compensate negative effects of the
user’s underestimation of their advertised service guarantees.
Although bandwidth expansion increases the SPs cost, however
as long as their expected payoff from user is higher than their
cost, its justifiable for them to perform bandwidth expansion
to retain their users.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the problem of user association in
wireless HetNets under PT, where all covering WiFi and
cellular SPs offer data services to users who are free to accept
or reject any of the received offers. We modeled this problem
using a Stackelberg game, and extracted all potential NEs
for this game under both EUT and PT. The NE existence
analysis reveals that some of the feasible NEs under EUT
become infeasible under PT when users underestimate the
advertised service guarantees by the SPs. In this situation, the
underestimation of service guarantees by the user increases the
chance of rejection for the SPs bids, and hence causes the SP’s
average utility to diminish under PT. To avoid such a utility
loss for the SPs under PT, we proposed a new bidding strategy
by which the SPs are able to cope with the underestimation of
their service guarantees by the user under PT. Our simulation
results demonstrate that using such a bidding strategy, the SPs
are able to retain most of their lost EUT users under PT by
incurring some additional costs, and hence reduce their utility
loss under PT.
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